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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*
RENDER TO CAESAR

Man is essentially a religious creature, and usually rather tolerant of his fellows'
religious beliefs. This is evidenced in the Constitution of the United States, Article
VI, which provides that ". . no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States"; and Amendment I which
requires that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." As in many states, the New York Constitution provides that "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profezsion
and worship, without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed in this state
to all mankind.... ." N. Y. CONsT. (1846) Art. 1, § 3.
This doctrine of religious freedom was recently invoked in a rather novel manner in the case of People v. Sandstrom, 167 M isc. 436, 3 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 1C06
(1938). The defendant, a member of a religious sect which subscribes to the
belief that to salute a flag contravenes the law of God, was convicted of having
violated the Education Law [N. Y. EDuCATioNAL LAw (1928) § 627] which requires
that parents shall send their children to school. He refused to do so, and claimed
that § 712 (I) of the Educational Law making it the duty of the Commissioner of
Education to prepare a program providing for a salute to the flag was unconstitutional, in that it unlawfully restricted the defendant's right to religious liberty,
guaranteed by Art I, § 3 of the N. Y. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U. S. Constitution.
The precise question presented had never before been decided in New York
State. In rendering its decision against the defendant, the New York court dismissed the contention that the act of saluting the flag of

Is it

the United States was a religious rite.

Similar decisions

Lawful to

on this point have been given in several other states of

Give Tribute

the Union: Nichols v. Mayor and School Committee of

to
Caesar?

Lynn, Mass., 7 N. E. (2d) 577, 110 A. L. P. 377 (Mass.
1937); Hering v. State Board of Education, 117 N. J. L.
455, 189 AtL 629, aff'd, 194 AtL 177 (1937); Lcoles v.
Landers, 184 Ga. 580, 192 S.E. 218 appeal dismissed, 58 Sup. Ct. 364 (1937).
In the case of Gobitis v. Minersville School Dist. of Pa., 21 F. Supp. 581 (E. D.
Pa. 1937) the court takes a viewpoint opposite to that of the New York decision
and declares that the Pennsylvania statute compelling students to salute the flag
is unconstitutional. It is argued that the individual concerned should be the judge
of the validity of his own religious beliefs and that the state should intervene only
when the acts of the individual are prejudicial to tie welfare of society as a whole.
The majority of the courts seems sound when it holds that by no stretch of a
reasonable imagination can the act of saluting the flag of the United States be
held to constitute an act of idolatry or a religious observance.
The Things
if every one were permitted to object to a law and have
That Are
it held unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated his
Caesar's
religious beliefs, such a condition would permit every citizen
to become a law unto himself. Instead of one Supreme
Court, we would have thousands.
The guarantees in the Federal and State Constitutions grant to every citizen
the right to hold any belief as to the nature of God. The Congress was deprived
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of all power over mere opinion. Yet there is no provision that any citizen may
practice his religious beliefs in any manner he may see fit. Obviously the Federal
and State governments may prohibit a person from performing an act, on religious
or other grounds, which would be prejudicial to the safety, health, property, or
personal rights of the people. The Constitution of the United States does not contain a definition of religion. One by our highest court, however, is found in the
case of Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342 (1889): "The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they
impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. It
is often confounded with the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect, but is
distinguishable from the latter." It is to be remembered, that just as the Federal
and State governments owe a duty to the people under its jurisdiction to protect
them and enforce the laws, so do the citizens owe the reciprocal duty to support
this government of their own choice and its laws.
It is at least questionable that the mere mechanical lifting of an arm 6r the rote
recitation of an oath of allegiance can inculcate patriotism. Nor would one unqualifiedly say, that an outward manifestation of fealty shows
Whose
a heart and mind appreciative of the values of our democlanage and
racy. Yet the flag of the United States is a symbol of its
Inscription
ideals. The salute to the flag is purely a patriotic gesture
Is This?
designed to show an appreciation and respect for the ideals
for which it stands. There is no question of a manifestation
of obeisance to a Supreme Being involved in this act. To claim so, would seem
to the majority to be a perversion of the true notion of religious liberty.
THE POOR RELATION
There is turmoil in New Jersey over the recent attempt to disenfranchise relief
recipients by securing the enforcement of Article II, § 1, of that state's constitution.
The section disables paupers from exercising the right of suffrage. Both a legal
and a politico-ethical problem seems to be raised by the situation. N. Y. Times,
Sept. 7, p. 27, col. 3.
Considering the former, is the relief recipient a "pauper" within the meaning of
the constitutional section? Attorney-General David T. Wilentz of New Jersey recently braved the wrath of those who would exclude the
A Threadbare
poor from the voting booth and declared that before anyone
Cloak
could be considered a pauper, appropriate legal proceedings
must be held by a judicial officer adjudging him a pauper.
N. Y. Times, Sept. 13, p. 25, col. 4, Mr. Wilentz relies upon Sayres v. Springfield,
8 N. J. L. 166 (1825), as his authority. In that case it was held that adjudication
by a magistrate is a prerequisite to receiving relief. However, the statement by
the court appeared as the construction of a statute in effect at the time and which
has since been repealed. It should be noted that this case was decided in 1825,
and deals with the Revised Laws, c. 40, §§ 11 and 12 of the Act of 1774, for the
relief and settlement of the poor. Even if that statute were still in effect there
would be ample room for the argument that the stated case merely required an
adjudication of pauperism as a condition precedent to the actual receipt of aid,
and has no bearing in determining the status of pauperism, preventing the exercise
of the right of suffrage under the present New Jersey constitution. This argument
is made unnecessary, however, by the fact of the subsequent revision of that statute.
In the New Jersey statutory revision of 1924, c. 132, § 19 declares that a poor
person is one who is unable to maintain himself or those dependent upon him.
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Section 31 of the same chapter empowers the Overseer of the Poor to determine
who are to be relieved by him. Chapter 123, Laws of 1938, gives the Director of
Welfare the power to determine who is to secure "emergency relief."
Now, do not these sections, indicating that giving emergency relief and determining
pauperism is the office of the Director of Welfare or the Overseer of the Poor
leave us in a disconcerting dilemma? If the determination
Prince
of these officials is not an adjudication, then adjudication is
or
no longer necessary in order to be a pauper in New Jersey;
Pauper
and if that determination is an adjudication, then all those
presently receiving relief are adjudicated paupers.
In other states it seems that legal adjudication is unnecessary to the condition
of pauperism. People ex rel. Welde v. Weissenback, 60 N. Y. 385, 391 (1875), cites
with approval the statement that to render one a pauper in law, there need be no
legal proceedings declaratory of, or producing that state, but if one is a pauper
in fact and applies for relief and receives it, he is a pauper rithin the meaning of
the statutes. The case of Allegliaiy County v. The City of Pittsburgh, 281 Pa.
300, 127 AUt. 72 (1924), declares that the term "poor" as used in the law is
synonymous with "pauper" which means one so poor that he must be supported
at the public expense. An application of these standards would make New Jersey
relief recipients paupers.
As a matter of American political philosophy it is difficult to understand the
disenfranchisement movement. In all probability, the major impetus for this drive
has been from political expedience. Are the intelligence,
Government
opinion, and desire of poor people to be stifled by their
by the
economic position? If relief recipients are to be disqualified
People
because they are supported by the government, may not
the next group be barred because their low income exempts
them from supporting the government? And also the succeeding group, which in
proportion to its relative size, is paying an insignificant share of our national
carrying cost? But follow this trend and the bulk of the population has lost its vote.
Ethically too, consider the morality of denying the franchise to those with the
status of relief recipients. Should this country become involved in a military
struggle they would have no voice in the choice between
The Paupers'
war and peace although they will gladly be granted the
"AMight"
opportunity to submit to draft, bear arms, and face death.
In a land committed to representative government, is it
moral to impose such a burden on those who are not represented at the decision?
The entire dispute could be instantly settled by following the example of Massachusetts which amended c. 51, § 1, of their Annotated Laws, wherein qualifications
of voters are stated, the addition exempting from the classification of paupers those
persons who have attempted to provide for themselves, and who have fallen into need
through no fault of their own.
PLACER MINiNG-NEW STvLE
As Europe suffers from a severe case of war fever, we on this side of the ocean
are afflicted with a malady, which although not as fatal as the European disease,
has its serious complications. It strikes people of advanced
Gold
age and low income particularly. "Pensionitis" is what we
Fever
have in mind. But no one is really immune. Climate does
not seem to have any influence upon it as it is now epidemic
in widely separated parts of the country. In sunny California the local species
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of the ailment seems to be the type most puzzling to the medicine men of an
already troubled financial world.
A proposed amendment to the California Constitution calls for the payment
of "Thirty Dollars Every Thursday" to unemployed persons, fifty years of age or
older, who have resided in California for at least one year.
Gold Is
Art. XXXII, the California State Retirement Life Pension
Where You
Plan § 9. According to § 7 of the proposed plan, these
Vote it
pensions are not to be paid in regular United States currency
but in State Warrants of $1.00 each which are to pass as
currency until redeemed. To make them negotiable, these warrants require the
addition of a 2 cent weekly stamp purchased with national coin. At the end of the
year, each warrant would bear $1.04 in stamps Thus the state has taken in enough
to redeem the warrant and still have money left over wherewith to pay administration
expenses of the plan. The government of California would be obligated to accept
these warrants in payment of taxes and fees. Proposed Art. XXXII § 13. Publicly
owned utilities and political divisions of California would be similarly obligated. The
state would also have the power to pay 50% of the salaries of governmental employees or other contractual obligations with these warrants. Proposed Art. XXXII,
§§ 14, 15. The plan has by petition become a proposed amendment to the California
Constitution and on November 8, ballots may make it law. N. Y. Times, Sept. 1, p. 1,
col. 5. Barring any interference, if the plan is adopted it will go into effect on
January 1, 1939.
However, the United States Supreme Court may be called on to review this
ballot-born alchemy. In Crummer v. City of Fort Pierce, 2 F. Supp. 737 (S. D.
Fla. 1932) it was held that a city could discharge its bonded indebtedness in lawful
money only referring to U. S. currency of course. Thus it would seem probable
that an argument could be made against the plan as unconstitutional in so far as
it declares that the warrants shall be used in payment of debts of the state or its
subdivisions.
According to the U. S. Constitution, Art. 1 § 8 (5), Congress alone has the power
to coin money and regulate the value thereof. In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall.
533, 549 (1869) and in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 545 (187Q), it was
pointed out that such power belonged exclusively to Congress. Is the California
plan an invasion of this power? If not so held, the condition resulting from
permitting each state as well as the National state to coin its own currency would
be chaotic indeed.
The provision of the plan permitting the state to pay its contractual obligations
to third parties in warrants seems also to indicate an undue interference with thie
right to contract. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 86 (1810);
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518
Iron
Pyrites
(1819). Would it not be forcing people to accept highly
?
ornamented documents of questionable value rather than
the more commonplace but more valuable currency used in
the United States? It appears at this time to be a deprivation of property without
due process of law, which is contra to the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S.
Constitution.
However, pending the decision of the constitutionality of the proposed amendment the State of California should prepare itself for an influx of mild and middle
aged folk come to seek its bounty. Although they will
probably arrive by motor and trailer with nary a docile
The "Thirty
burro to bear the picks and shovels, nor whirling sluice-pan
Niners"
to trap the shining nuggets, may they yet come to a brigh'er
fleece than their ancient sire, Jason, or their fathers of "49."

